SECURITIES-FRAuD---"FRAUD" PROSCRIBED BY SEC RULE 1OB-5
DOES NOT ENCOMPASS BREACHES OF FIDUCIARY DUTY WHEN
FULL DISCLOSURE IS MADE-Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,

430 U.S. 462 (1977).
In July, 1974, Santa Fe Natural Resources, Inc., a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Santa Fe Industries, Inc., owned ninety-five percent of
the capital stock of Kirby Lumber Co., a Delaware corporation.' In
order to effectuate a short-form merger in compliance with section
253 of the Delaware Corporation Law, 2 Santa Fe Natural Resources
1 Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd and
remanded, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). The remaining five percent of the Kirby stock was held
by S. William Green and others. 533 F.2d at 1285, 1287-88. In 1936, Santa Fe Industries, Inc. had acquired 60% of Kirby's stock through a subsidiary. Brief for Petitioners
at 3, Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). Between 1936 and 1973, Santa
Fe and its subsidiaries acquired an additional 35% of the stock. Id.
2 DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 253 (1975 & Cure. Supp. 1976). Thirty-eight states currently
have short-form merger statutes. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1299 n.1
(2d Cir. 1976) (Moore, J., dissenting), rev'd and remanded, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). The
typical short-form merger statute permits a parent company, owning 90 to 95% of a subsidiary's stock, to merge the subsidiary into itself or another subsidiary corporation. See,
e.g., CAL. GEN. CORP. CODE § 1110(b) (West 1977) (parent must own at least 90% of
subsidiary's stock); DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 253(a) (1975) (same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:105(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978) (same); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 905(a) (McKinney 1963
& Cum. Supp. 1977-1978) (parent must own at least 95% of subsidiary's stock). See generally! Borden, Going Private--Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 987,
997 n.54 (1974); Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903, 911 & n. 3 9 (1975). These statutes dispense with many of the requirements of long-form mergers. Borden, supra at
997 n.54. In particular, the need for prior shareholder approval is frequently eliminated.
Note, supra at 911. This is accomplished either explicitly, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 14A:10-5(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 905(a) (McKinney
1963 & Cum. Supp. 1977-1978), or by implication, e.g., CAL. GEN. CORP. CODE § 1110(b)
(West 1977); DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 253(a) (1975). The Delaware statute is typical in requiring only the approval of the parent corporation's board of directors for the merger to be
consummated. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 253(a) (1975).
In most states, once a short-form merger has been consummated, a right of appraisal
is considered the sole recourse available to dissatisfied minority shareholders. Borden,
supra at 1023-24 & n.156. This remedy, under Delaware law, takes the form of an
independent valuation of the minority's shares by a court-appointed appraiser. DEL.
CODE tit. 8, § 2 6 2(c) (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1976). Delaware case law prior to Green had
held that, absent "actual fraud," the exclusive remedy for a shareholder challenging a
short-form merger was that of a statutory appraisal. Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41
Del. Ch. 7, 9-10, 187 A.2d 78, 80 (Sup. Ct. 1962). For a discussion of the exclusiveness
of the Delaware appraisal statute, see note 143 infra. The effectiveness of the appraisal
remedy in vindicating the rights of dissenting shareholders has been criticized. Green v.
Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d at 1297 & n.4 (Mansfield, J., concurring); Brudney &
Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Take Overs, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297,
304-07 (1974). One of the main criticisms has been that appraisal statutes, e.g., DEL.
CODE tit. 8, § 262(b) (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1976), may not allow the appraiser to consider
any increase in share value resulting from the merger itself 533 F.2d at 1297 n.4 (Mansfield, J., concurring).
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organized Forest Products, Inc. and transferred its Kirby stock to
Forest in exchange for all of Forest's stock. 3 On July 30, 1974, the
board of directors of Forest Products voted to merge Forest into
4
Kirby, leaving Kirby as the surviving corporation
On August 1, the reorganized Kirby Lumber Co. notified its
minority shareholders of the merger and informed them that their
stock would be purchased for $150 per share. 5 At the same time, the
minority shareholders received an Information Statement containing
6
details of the merger transaction and the financial condition of Kirby.
The notification also advised the stockholders that if they disagreed
with the valuation placed on their stock, they had the right, under
section 262 of the Delaware Corporation Law, 7 to seek an appraisal of
The ease with which short-form mergers can be accomplished has led many corporations to use the device when they wish to "go private." See Note, supra at 909-11.
"'Going private" transactions are those in which a corporation "attempt[s] to reacquire
from investors all the publicly held common stock in their firms." Id. at 903. Frequently, a "going private" transaction will involve a process whereby the parent company first acquires the percentage of stock required by the short-form statute through a
tender offer and then effectuates a short-form merger. Id. at 909-11. A sharp drop in
stock prices in 1974, making possible reacquisition of publicly-held shares "at bargain
prices," led many corporations to "go private," frequently resulting in large financial
gains for corporate insiders at the expense of the minority shareholders. See id. at 90305. The exercise of controlling influence by majority shareholders to approve a merger
resulting in benefits to themselves at the expense of the minority shareholders is the
basis for contending that the transaction is unfair and thus a breach of fiduciary duty.
See Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d at 1285. See also Katz, Legal Questions
Involved in Corporate Attempts to "Go Private," in NEW TRENDS AND SPECIAL PROBLEMS UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS 1975, at 223, 229-30 (Practising Law Institute

1975). For a discussion of fiduciary duty, see note 25 infra and accompanying text.
3 Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1288 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd and
remanded, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). Forest Products, Inc. received 474,675Y2 shares of Kirby
and $3,798,675 in cash. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 849, 851 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), aff'd in part, rev'd and remanded in part, 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd and
remanded, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). In return, Forest tendered all of its issued shares to
Santa Fe Resources and accepted responsibility for certain expenses created by its proposed merger with Kirby Lumber Co. 391 F. Supp. at 851.
4 Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 849, 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd in
part, rev'd and remanded in part, 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd and remanded, 430
U.S. 462 (1977).
5 Green v.Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 849, 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd in part,
rev'd and remanded in part, 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd and remanded, 430
U.S. 462 (1977). Santa Fe had arranged with Morgan Stanley & Co. for an appraisal of
the stock's value. 391 F. Supp. at 851. Based on its study of Kirby's financial condition
and market conditions, Morgan Stanley had valued the Kirby stock at $125 per share. Id.
6 Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1288 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd and
remanded, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262 (1975 & Cur. Supp. 1976) provides in part:
(c) Within 120 (lays after the effective date of the merger or consolidation,
the corporation or any stockholder who has complied with subsections (a) and
(b)of this section . .. may file
a petition in the Court of Chancery demanding a
determination of the value of the stock of allsuch stockholders.
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the value of their shares in the Delaware courts. 8 The procedures
utilized to accomplish the Kirby-Forest merger were in accordance
with section 253 which does not require prior shareholder approval. 9
Under the statute, a merger resolution must stipulate the price at
which minority shares will be purchased; post-merger notice to the
shareholders is then required in order that they may accept the offered price or "demand" an appraisal of their shares. 10
In lieu of tendering their stock for the offered price, the minority shareholders petitioned for an appraisal of the stock on August
21, 1974.11 On September 9, however, they withdrew this demand
and, the following day, initiated a federal suit in the Southern District of New York. 12 The plaintiffs alleged that Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rule 10b-513 and section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which proscribes the use of "any
manipulative or deceptive device" "in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security,"'1 4 had been violated by the Kirby-Forest
8 Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 849, 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd in
part, rev'd and remanded in part, 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd and remanded,
430 U.S. 462 (1977).
9 Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 849, 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd in
part, rev'd and remanded in part, 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd and remanded,
430 U.S. 462 (1977); see DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 253(a) (1975).
10 DEL. CODE tit. 8 §§ 253(a), (d), 262(d) (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1976).
11Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1288 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd and
remanded, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
12 Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1285, 1288 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd
and remanded, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). The plaintiffs alleged federal jurisdiction of their
claims based on section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(1976), and diversity of citizenship. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 849, 851
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd in part, rev'd and remanded in part, 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir.
1976), rev'd and remanded, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). They also asserted that the court had
pendent jurisdiction over their state claims of breach of fiduciary duty. 391 F. Supp. at
851. Since the district court found complete diversity to be lacking, jurisdiction over
both federal and state claims was dependent upon section 27 of the 1934 Act, which
grants to federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over cases alleging violations of the Act.
391 F. Supp. at 851.
13SEC rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977). Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
14 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). That statute provides in pertinent part:
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merger. 15 The plaintiffs contended that the merger itself violated rule
10b-5 since it was no more than a device to "freeze-out" the minority
for the majority's benefit and was consummated "without [a] justifiable business purpose .. .[or] prior notice to the minority shareholders."1 6 They also argued that their Kirby stock had been undervalued
and that this undervaluation constituted a "fraud" in violation of the
17
rule.
The district court, in Green v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. ,18 dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.' 9 Since the plaintiffs had not asserted any "omission, misstatement or fraudulent course of conduct" in connection
with the merger, 2 0 the district court held that they had failed to al21
lege the type of fraud actionable under the federal securities laws.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interestate [sic] commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1285 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd and
remanded, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
16 Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 849, 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd in
part, rev'd and remanded in part, 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd and remanded,
430 U.S. 462 (1977).
17 Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 849, 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd in
part, rev'd and remanded in part, 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd and remanded,
430 U.S. 462 (1977). The Information Statement distributed by Santa Fe valued Kirby's
assets at $320 million. 533 F.2d at 1288. Arguing that the correct value of their stock
would reflect a pro rate distribution of Kirby's assets, the plaintiffs contended that the
stock should be valued at $772 per share. Id.; 391 F. Supp. at 853. Morgan Stanley
reached its opinion that the stock was worth $125 per share by forecasting the price at
which the stock would be traded on the market. 533 F.2d at 1288; see note 5 supra.
The plaintiffs contended that the offered price of $150, combined with the letter
from Morgan Stanley valuing the stock at $125, was an attempt "to create the erroneous
appearance that [defendants were] generous in fixing a value $25 higher than the Morgan appraisal." Brief for Respondents at 5, Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Respondents]. Morgan Stanley & Co. had been joined
as a defendant since the plaintiffs alleged that Morgan has assisted Santa Fe in the alleged fraud by knowingly submitting a low valuation of the stock. 391 F. Supp. at 852.
18 391 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd in part, rev'd and remanded in part, 533
F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd and remanded, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
19391 F. Supp. at 855, 856.
20 Id. at 854.
21 See id. at 853-55. The court found that the defendants had complied with all the
requirements of the Delaware short-form merger statute. See id. at 852-53. Furthermore,
the court noted that all the plaintiffs' allegations of undervaluation were based upon
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The court viewed the fairness of the offered price as the only issue
between the parties and, therefore, concluded that the plaintiffs
should have been limited to their state remedy of appraisal for a de22
termination as to the fair value of the stock.
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the complaint against Santa Fe and Kirby2 3 and held that
the facts, if established as alleged by the plaintiffs, stated a cause of
action under rule 10b-5. 24 Relying on principles of fiduciary duty
which require majority shareholders to deal fairly with the minority
shareholders in any transaction in which the majority stands to benefit,2 5 Judge Medina held that an allegation of "misrepresentation or
data contained in Santa Fe's Information Statement. Id. at 853-54. The court therefore
concluded that Santa Fe had made complete disclosure of all relevant facts pertaining to
the merger. Id. at 854.
As additional support for its conclusion, the district court cited proposed SEC Rules
13e-3A and 13e-3B. 391 F. Supp. at 854-55; see SEC Securities Act Release No. 5567
(Feb. 6, 1975), [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,104 at 85,489.
Proposed SEC Rule 13e-3B(a) would invalidate a merger resulting in the "freeze-out" of
the minority shareholders unless "a valid business purpose" existed for the merger. Id.
at 85,093. The court viewed these proposed rules as an indication that the Securities
and Exchange Commission did not believe rule 10b-5 was sufficiently broad to cover
such attempted "freeze-outs" when full and adequate disclosure had been made. See
391 F. Supp. at 854-55.
Additionally, the district court stated that, assuming the plaintiffs had been able to
establish incomplete disclosure, they would not have been able to prove a causal connection between any such "deception" and the damages they suffered. Id. For a discussion of the causal connection requirement in rule 10b-5 cases, see note 51 infra.
22 See 391 F. Supp. at 854. Since the district court dismissed the complaint against
all the defendants, it did not find it necessary to decide which method of valuation-pro
rata distribution or forecast of market value-was correct. Id. at 853, 856; see note 17
supra and accompanying text.
23 Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1290-91 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd and
remanded, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal against defendant Morgan Stanley & Co. 533 F.2d at 1294. For a discussion of the Morgan dismissal, see note 27 infra.
24 Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1290-91, 1294 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd
and remanded, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
25 Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1290-91 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd and
remanded, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). The court relied upon Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295
(1939), for the proposition "that directors and controlling shareholders are fiduciaries."
533 F.2d at 1290. In Pepper, the Supreme Court had stated:
A director is a fiduciary. So is a dominant or controlling stockholder or group of
stockholders. Their powers are powers in trust. Their dealings with the corporation are subjected to rigorous scrutiny and where any of their contracts or engagements with the corporation is challenged the burden is on the director or
stockholder not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show
its inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested
therein. The essence of the test is whether or not under all the circumstances
the transaction carries the earmarks of an arm's length bargain.
308 U.S. at 306-07 (citations omitted).

19781

NOTES

lack of disclosure" was not necessary under the facts presented 2 6s In
the court's view, a merger accomplished without a justifiable business
purpose was a breach of fiduciary duty which constituted a fraud ac27
tionable under rule 10b-5.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 28 and, in Santa Fe IndusThe fiduciary responsibilities of directors and majority shareholders are most frequently expressed in terms of care and loyalty. See W. GARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 513-14, 550-51 (4th ed. 1969). In New York, for example, directors are
required to "perform [their] duties . . . in good faith and with that degree of care which
an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances."
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney Cume. Supp. 1977-78). The concept of loyalty
requires directors to "subordinate their individual and private interests to their duty to
the corporation whenever the two conflict." Winter v. Anderson, 242 App. Div. 430, 431,
275 N.Y.S. 373, 376 (1934). Corporate directors are not allowed to receive any personal
gain as a result of their positions "which is not enjoyed in common by all the stockholders." Id. At least one state court has imposed similar obligations upon majority
shareholders in their dealings with the minority. Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal.
3d 93, 108, 460 P.2d 464, 471, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 599 (1969). The Jones court applied the
standard, formulated by the Supreme Court in Pepper, that the test for determining
whether the majority shareholders had breached their fiduciary duty to the minority was
one of " 'inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested
therein.' " Id. at 108, 460 P.2d at 472, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 600 (quoting from Remillard
Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini, 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 420, 241 P.2d 66, 74-75 (Ct. App.
1952) (applying "inherent fairness" standard to dealings of interested directors)). See
generally Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 725, 728
(1956); Comment, The Fiduciary Relation of the Dominant Shareholder to the Vlinorityj
Shareholders, 9 HASTINGS L.J. 306, 314 (1958).
A case frequently cited for the proposition that a merger without a valid corporate
purpose may constitute a breach of fiduciary duty is Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490
F.2d 563, 570-71 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974). In Bryan, the Fifth Circuit
held that such a merger "was clearly a violation of the plaintiff's rights under [Georgia]
state law." 490 F.2d at 571. The Bryan court, however, did not decide whether this
breach of fiduciary duty under state law also violated rule 10b-5.1d. For a discussion of
fiduciary duty in relation to "going private" transactions, see Note, supra note 2, at
919-24.
26 Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1287, 1291 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd
and remanded, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
27 Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1287, 1290-91 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd
and remanded, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). While upholding the plaintiffs' claim against Santa
Fe and Kirby, the Second Circuit dismissed the complaint against defendant Morgan
Stanley & Co. 533 F.2d at 1292-94. The court reasoned that Morgan Stanley was not in
a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiffs and thus a breach of fiduciary duty, the proposed basis of Santa Fe's liability, could not have been committed by Morgan. Id.
It is likely that the alleged low valuation of the plaintiffs' stock, combined with the
lack of prior notice which precluded injunctive relief, influenced the court's conclusion
that a merger lacking a valid corporate purpose could constitute a breach of fiduciary
duty. See id. at 1291. However, the majority found it unnecessary to decide whether a
claim of low valuation alone, without an allegation of a lack of valid business purpose
for a merger, would be sufficient to sustain an action under rule 10b-5. Id. at 1291. The
Second Circuit also declined to decide the proper valuation method for the stock, stating that such a "thorny subject" should be determined at the trial level. Id. at 1294.
28 Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 429 U.S. 814 (1976).
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tries, Inc. v. Green,2 9 reversed the Second Circuit decision.3 0 Writing for the majority of the Court, Justice White held that an allegation of a breach of fiduciary duty, unaccompanied by an allegation of
" 'manipulative or deceptive' " conduct, was insufficient to support
31
a claim under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), 32 of which section 10(b) is a part, was enacted by Congress in response to the stock
market crash of 1929.33 Unlike the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act), 3
which imposes disclosure requirements upon "'theinitial distribution
of securities," 3 5 the 1934 Act was directed at subsequent trading in
securities. It was designed to maintain the integrity of the securities
markets by guarding against, inter alia, fraudulent and manipulative
practices affecting the price of stock traded on the markets. 36 This
goal was to be accomplished by ensuring that information sufficient
to make intelligent decisions was disclosed to investors engaging in
securities transactions. 37 Section 4 of the 1934 Act created the Secur- 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
3o Id. at 471.
31 Id. at 464, 473-74.
32 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
3 See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1933); S. REP. No. 792, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1934). For a discussion of the historical events culminating in the
passage of the 1934 Act, see 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 119L-28 (1961).
34 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1976).
35 1 L. Loss, supra note 33, at 130. Under the 1933 Act, all material facts concerning
initial public offerings of securities were to be submitted to the Federal Trade Commission in a registration statement. Id. at 129-30. In 1934, the Securities and Exchange
Commission was established and replaced the FTC in administering the 1933 Act. Id. at
129; see text accompanying notes 38-39 infra. Under the 1933 Act, the Commission
would determine whether the registration statement was "accurate and complete" but
would not pass judgment on the fairness or profitability of the proposed offering's terms.
Id. at 130.
3
6 See id. at 130-31. Although the majority of the 1934 Act's provisions focus on market transactions, see id., the scope of section 10(b) is broader in that it has been applied to
situations arising in interstate commerce which did not involve securities traded on an
exchange. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 7-10 (1971)
("that the transaction is not conducted through a securities exchange or an organized
over-the-counter market is irrelevant to the coverage of § 10(b)"); Hooper v. Mountain
States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 201 (5th Cir. 1960) (rule 10b-5 applicable "even though
the transaction is conducted directly between the buyer and seller and not through a
securities exchange or an organized over-the-counter market"), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
814 (1961); see Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369, 370-73 (3d Cir. 1956); 3 L.
Loss, supra note 33, at 1466-67.
37 See I L. Loss, supra note 33, at 130. Disclosure to investors is achieved under
section 12, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1976), which requires registration by issuers of stock if the
company involved has assets greater than $1,000,000 and more than 500 security holders.
Additionally, an issuer required to register under section 12 must make periodic reports
to the SEC under section 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1976), concerning, inter alia, the com-
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ities and Exchange Commission 38 and vested the Commission with
authority to develop rules and regulations necessary to enforce the
provisions of both Acts. 39 In 1942, the SEC promulgated rule 10b-5
40
in order to effectuate the purposes of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.
The rule contains three clauses which proscribe, "in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security," the use of "any device, scheme,
or artifice to defraud," the misrepresentation or omission "of a material fact," and "any act, practice, or course of business which operates . . . as a fraud or deceit."41
The desire to give full effect to the prophylactic purposes of the
1934 Act led some courts to accord the broad language of rule 10b-5
an expansive interpretation.4 2 Since neither the rule nor the statute
pany's current financial condition. Section 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976), governs the regulation of proxies, and section 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1976), requires "insider" shareholders to
report all changes in their stock ownership and imposes liability on such "insiders" for
profits derived from any purchase-sale/sale-purchase transaction in their company's stock
concluded within six months. In contrast to the specific disclosure requirements of these
sections, section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976), was described by one of its draftsmen as "a
catch-all clause to prevent manipulative devices." Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720
Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115
(1934) (remarks of Mr. Corcoran).
38 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1976).
39 Id.; see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).
40 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976); 3 L. Loss, supra note 33,
at 1426-27. Rule 10b-5 was promulgated in response to the inapplicability of section
1 7 (a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976), to frauds perpetrated by purchasers of
stock. 3 L. Loss, supra at 1423-26. The language of section 17(a) has been interpreted
as applying only to frauds committed by sellers against purchasers. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952); Barnett
v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766, 774 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); L. Loss, supra at 1423-24.
This loophole in the 1933 Act's main anti-fraud provision permitted corporate directors
and insider shareholders, among others, to engage in fraudulent practices in purchasing
their company's stock with little fear of civil sanction under the federal statute. 3 L. Loss,
supra at 1426. When an attempt to amend section 17(a) to a cover purchasers as well as
sellers failed, the Commission promulgated rule 10b-5 under section 10(b) of the
1934 Act. Id. at 1426-27. The language of rule 10b-5 is almost identical to that of section
17(a) except the rule is applicable to "the purchase or sale of any security." Compare 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977) with 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976).
41 17 C.F.R. § 240. 10b-5 (1977). For the text of rule 10b-5, see note 13 supra.
42
See, e.g., Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865, 869 (3d Cir. 1968); Ruckle v. Roto Am.
Corp., 339 F.2d 24, 28-29 (2d Cir. 1964). See also 3 L. Loss, supra note 33, at 1427,
1448-49. The history of litigation under the rule has been surrounded by controversy
and divergent holdings concerning the scope of the rule. See Bloomenthal, Introductory
Survey, 8 SEC. L. REV. xii, xiii (1976); Note, The Controlling Influence Standard in
Rule 10b-5 Corporate Mismanagement Cases, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1007, 1007 n.5 (1973).
The confusion generated by the broad language of lob-5 has been compounded by the
fact that, in many instances, interpretation of the rule has been left to the lower federal
courts. Bloomenthal, supra at xiii. Several major substantive principles of lOb-5 litigation were originally established in lower federal courts and subsequently adopted by
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explicitly creates a cause of action in favor of a private party, 43 an
early issue faced by the courts was whether such a party could maintain suit for violation of the rule. 44 In 1946, a federal court first recognized that private parties might have an implied cause of action 4if5
they are within the class intended to be protected by the statute.
The rapid and widespread acceptance of this judicially-created cause
of action generated an increasing amount of litigation involving alleged
46
violations of the rule.
Judicial implication of a private right of action under rule 10b-5
necessitated a determination of congressional intent in enacting section 10(b). 4 7 While the statutory language suggests that section 10(b)
the Supreme Court. The theory of an implied private right of action under rule IOb-5
was conceived by a district court in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512,
513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946), and recognized as "established" by the Supreme Court in Superindendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). The
"purchaser-seller" standing limitation, see notes 93-97 infra and accompanying text,
enunciated by the Second Circuit in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461,
463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952), was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court
more than twenty years later in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 425 U.S. 723,
731 (1975).
There are, however, aspects of 10b-5 litigation in which a lower court's opinion remains the controlling authority. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833,
849-54 (2d Cir. 1968) (corporate "insider" defined as anyone in possession of material inside information; such "insiders" must disclose the information or refrain
from trading), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.,
519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir.) (defining extraterritorial jurisdiction under rule 10b-5),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015-18 (2d Cir.
1975) (same).
In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has taken a more active role in defining the scope of rule 10b-5. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462
(1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). See also Bloomenthal, supra
at xiii-xiv; notes 93-104 infra and accompanying text.
43 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729-30 (1975).
4 See 3 L. Loss, supra note 33, at 1759-61.
45 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
6 See 1 A. BROMBERC, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD-SEC RULE 1OB-5 §2.2, at 451
(1970); 3 L. Loss, supra note 33, at 1759. The Supreme Court did not explicitly address
the issue of implied private rights of action under section 10(b) or rule 10b-5 until
twenty-four years after they had been initially recognized. In Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971), the Court considered
"[iut [to be] established that a private right of action is implied under § 10(b)." The
Court, however, had previously suggested the existence of such right of action under
section 14 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976), in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,
428, 432 (1964). In that case the Court noted that "[p]rivate enforcement of the proxy
rules provides a necessary supplement to Commission action." The growth of litigation
resulting from the recognition of private rights of action under section 10(b) and rule
1ob-5 has been characterized by Justice Rehnquist as "a judicial oak which has grown
from little more than a legislative acorn." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
47 See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 956 (1952).
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may be a codification of an action in deceit, some courts and commentators reasoned that Congress must have intended to reach conduct not previously actionable under the common law.4 Although
some modifications occurred, such as recognizing a nondisclosure as a
basis for 10b-5 liability, 4 9 the earlier courts tended to define the
statute and the rule in terms of the elements of a deceit. 50 This required the plaintiff to allege and prove that as a result of his reliance 51 on an intentional 52 and material 53 misrepresentation or non41 See A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1967) ("[nlovel or
atypical [fraudulent] methods should not provide immunity from the securities laws");
89 HARV. L. REV. 1917, 1926 & n.50 (1976). See also McClure v. Borne Chemical Co.,
292 F.2d 824, 834 (3d Cir.) (section 10(b) described as "part of a statutory scheme which
had as its purpose the creation of a new federal law of management-stockholder relations"), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961).
49 3 L. Loss, supra note 33, at 1431; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 105, at 685-86 (4th ed. 1971). The earliest common law definition of deceit
included only "outright lie[s]," 3 L. Loss, supra at 1431, 1433, but was later liberalized
to include "half truths," id. at 1433-34. In contrast, a total nondisclosure was not considered to be within the ambit of deceit. Id. at 1434. In 1965, however, the Second
Circuit held that rule 10b-5 was not limited to the "common law requirement of affirmative misrepresentation" but also encompassed instances of complete nondisclosure. List
v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 461-62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
This inclusion of a nondisclosure within the 10b-5 prohibition provided one of the
clearest examples of the courts liberalizing the common law deceit requirements in
cases alleging 10b-5 violations. See 3 L. Loss, supra at 1432-36; Jacobs, What Is a
Misleading Statement or Omission Under Rule lob-57, 42 FORDHAM L. REv. 243, 245
(1973).
50 O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 767 (2d Cir. 1964) (limiting 10b-5 violations to
instances of "deceit, withheld information or misstatement of material fact"); see, e.g.,
List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.) (applying "the well known and
well understood common law definitions of" certain elements of a deceit while expanding 10b-5 liability to include nondisclosure), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); Barnett
v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766, 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (10b-5 claim requires "in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, . . . deception . . . by way of affirmative
misrepresentation or omission of material facts, . . . that has at least some causal relationship to the" injury suffered). In his concurring opinion in Green, Judge Mansfield
acknowledged that the court's "initial tendency was to adhere rather closely to the elements of common law fraud . .. in interpreting Rule l0b-5." 533 F.2d at 1296.
The interchangeable use of the terms "fraud" and "deceit" and the "failure to distinguish" between fraud at law and equitable fraud has created a great deal of confusion. W. PROSSER & J. WADE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 760
(5th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as W. PROSSER]. For purposes of defining the elements
of a 10b-5 action, this note will consider common law fraud and deceit to be substantially equivalent.
51 3 L. Loss, supra note 33, at 1431; Note, supra note 42, at 1015; Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 88 HARV. L. REV. 584, 584
n.3 (1975); see W. PROSSER, supra note 49, § 105, at 685-86. Requiring the plaintiff to
establish reliance was justified as a means of proving that the defendant's misrepresentation or nondisclosure caused the plaintiff's injury. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d
457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); Note, 88 HARV. L. REv., supra at
587-88. List is the most frequently cited early case for the requirement of establishing
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reliance in 10b-5 cases. Id. at 586 n.12. In List, the Second Circuit adopted the test
proposed in the Restatement of Torts for establishing reliance which requires the plaintiff to prove that " 'the misrepresentation [wals a substantial factor in determining the
course of conduct which result[ed] in [the plaintiff's] loss.' " 340 F.2d at 462 (quoting
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 546 (1938)). While the List court held that the common law
tort concept of actual reliance, or "causation in fact," was a requisite in establishing a
10b-5 violation, 340 F.2d at 463, it liberalized the definition of the concept in cases
involving nondisclosures, see id. Rejecting the argument that the plaintiff "must prove
he actively relied on the silence of the defendant, either because he consciously had in
mind the negative of the fact concealed, or perhaps because he deliberately put his trust
in the advice of the defendant," the court reasoned that "[tihe proper test [for establishing reliance in such cases] is whether the plaintiff would have been influenced to act
differently than he did act if the defendant had disclosed to him the undisclosed fact."
Id.
In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), the Supreme Court
further relaxed the reliance requirement in nondisclosure cases. Id. at 153-54. Recognizing the difficulty of establishing reliance on undisclosed facts, the Court held that, in
such cases, it was sufficient for 10b-5 purposes to establish "that a reasonable investor
might have considered [the omitted facts] important in the making of [his] decision." Id.
The Court concluded that "[t]his obligation to disclose and this withholding of a material fact established the requisite element of causation in fact." Id. at 154. The Affiliated
Ute holding has been interpreted as establishing "a presumption of reliance" once the
materiality of an undisclosed fact has been demonstrated. Note, 88 HARV. L. REV.,
supra at 587. For a discussion of materiality, see note 53 infra. Since the Affiliated Ute
case involved a nondisclosure, 406 U.S. at 153-54, it remained unclear whether the
earlier and stricter test of actual reliance referred to by the List court would still be
applied to cases involving alleged misrepresentations. For a discussion of the lower
courts' application of the Affiliated Ute concept of reliance in a variety of situations, see
cases cited in Note, 88 HA~v. L. REV., supra at 587-89 & nn.22-28.
52 W. PROSSER, supra note 49, § 107, at 669-700. When applied to a 10b-5 violation,
the common law requirement of scienter, or the intent to deceive, prevents the plaintiff
from recovering if the alleged deception occurred as a result of the defendant's negligent behavior. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976); see notes 98-104
infra and accompanying text.
- 3 L. Loss, supra note 33, at 1431; W. PROSSER, supra note 49, § 105, at 685-86.
At common law, a material fact was defined as one to which " 'a reasonable man would
attach importance . . . in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question.'" List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.) (quoting from RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 538(2)(a) (1938)), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965). This formulation
of materiality had been applied by the lower courts in a number of earlier lOb-5 cases.
See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969). The courts, however, have suggested an alternative definition of
materiality emphasizing "those facts 'which in reasonable and objective contemplation
might affect the value of the corporation's stock or securities.' " List v. Fashion Park,
Inc., 340 F.2d at 462 (quoting from Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir.
1963)); see SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 849.
Subsequently, in conjunction with its discussion of the reliance issue in nondisclosure cases, the Supreme Court, in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128
(1971), used language in defining materiality which suggested that a lesser burden of
proof would be required of the plaintiff. See id. at 153-54. For a discussion of the Affiliated Ute definition of reliance, see note 51 supra. In that case, the Court held that
the necessary reliance could be presumed if the plaintiff could show "that the facts
withheld [were] material in the sense that a reasonable investor might have considered
them important in the making of [his] decision." 406 U.S. at 153-54 (emphasis added).
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disclosure, 54 he suffered an injury. 55 The approach to rule 10b-5 in
terms of these traditional elements was reflected in an early Second
Circuit decision. 56 Although primarily known for its establishment of
the purchaser-seller standing requirement, 57 Birnbaum v. Newport
Steel Corp.s s expressed the earlier view of the Second Circuit that
section 10(b) was "directed solely at that type of misrepresentation or
fraudulent practice usually associated with the sale or purchase of
securities rather than at fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs." 5 9 The inconsistent utilization of this Birnbaum principle by
some courts, particularly in the Second Circuit, created confusion in
later decisions as to the applicability of rule 10b-5 in cases where a
breach of fiduciary duty alone, absent any misrepresentation or non60
disclosure, was alleged.
The Court, however, in TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 447 n.9 (1976),
rejected the contention that the Affiliated Ute formulation of materiality was "dispositive." Northway involved an alleged violation of § 14 (a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)
(1976), 426 U.S. at 441, which proscribes materially misleading statements and omissions
in proxy solicitations, see 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976). In rejecting the "might have considered . . . important" standard for materiality in regard to § 14(a), the Court reasoned
that neither Affiliated Ute nor Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970),
which had used similar language, was intended to provide a definition of materiality
since they were concerned with the element of reliance. 426 U.S. at 447 & n.9. Instead,
the Northway Court stated that the proper test for materiality under § 14(a) was whether
"there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider [the fact]
important in deciding how to vote." Id. at 449. Although the Northway Court was defining materiality under section 14(a), its reference to several section 10(b) cases, particularly Affiliated Ute, suggests that it would apply a similar definition of materiality under
section 10(b). See 426 U.S. at 445-46 n.8, 447 n.9.
5 List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965); 3 L. LOSS, supra note 33, at 1431; W. PROSSER, supra note 49, § 105, at 685-86.
Although the classical definition of a deceit included only affirmative misrepresentations, 3 L. Loss, supra at 1431-34, nondisclosures were considered to be within the
ambit of rule lOb-5. See note 49 supra and accompanying text. For a discussion of what
constitutes a misrepresentation, see Jacobs, supra note 49. For a discussion of the requirement that a misrepresentation or nondisclosure be present in a rule 10b-5 action,
see notes 58-91 infra and accompanying text.
55 3 L. Loss, supra note 33, at 1431; W. PROSSER, supra note 49, § 105, at 685-86.
This element was described by the Second Circuit as "loss causation" in Schlick v.
Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380-81 (2d Cir. 1974) ("loss causation" proved
by establishing "that the misrepresentations or omissions caused the economic harm"),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975).
56 See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 956 (1952).
5' Note, supra note 42, at 1016-18. For a discussion of the purchaser-seller requirement, see notes 93-97 infra and accompanying text.
58 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir,), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
59 193 F.2d at 464. For a discussion of the facts in Birnbaum, see note 94 infra.
6
1Compare O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 768 (2d Cir. 1964) with Ruckle v.
Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24, 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1964). These two cases decided within one
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Subsequently, several courts relaxed the strict Birnbaum approach to 10b-5 and suggested that conduct not containing all the
traditional elements of deceit could be considered a "fraud" within
the reach of the rule's prohibition. 61 This approach was illustrated permonth of each other are illustrative of the "highly checkered history" of rule 10b-5 in
cases alleging breaches of fiduciary duty. Note, supra note 42, at 1016. In Ruckle, the
Second Circuit reversed the lower court's dismissal of a derivative action seeking injunctive relief to prevent a corporation from issuing and selling its securities to the
president of Roto American. 339 F.2d at 26, 29. The plaintiff had alleged that the transaction was a fraud in violation of rule 10b-5 since the defendant directors had failed to
disclose certain information to the minority directors at the board meeting at which the
stock issuance was approved. Id. at 26. The court initially disposed of the Birnbaum
purchaser-seller limitation, which bars an action in certain circumstances, see notes
93-96 infra and accompanying text, by holding that a corporation, when it issues and
sells its own stock, is a "seller" and consequently a derivative action was maintainable
on its behalf. 339 F.2d at 27-28. The court then faced the issue of whether the alleged
conduct constituted a violation of the rule and, in dictum, noted that the "claims involv[ed] possible breaches by corporate directors of their fiduciary responsibilities." Id.
at 26. The Ruckle court did not, however, base its upholding of the plaintiffs' complaint
on this alleged breach of fiduciary duty. Rather, it "reject[ed] such cliches as the directors constitute the corporation and a corporation, like any other person, cannot defraud
itself" and held that a 10b-5 claim would be established if the plaintiffs showed that the
majority directors had deceived the corporation by misrepresenting certain facts at the
board meeting. Id. at 29.
In a case decided shortly thereafter, the Second Circuit interpreted Ruckle to mean
that while conduct can be both a breach of fiduciary duty and a violation of 10b-5, to be
actionable under the rule there must be an allegation of a deception. See O'Neill v.
Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 768 (2d Cir. 1964). O'Neill was a derivative action brought by a
shareholder of National Airlines who challenged a re-exchange of shares between National and Pan American Airlines which had been ordered by the Civil Aeronautics
Board. Id. at 766-67. The plaintiff alleged that National's board, in an attempt to maintain their control over the corporation, complied with the order in a manner which was
not in the best interests of National. Id. Stating that the complaint contained "no serious
claim of deceit, withheld information or misstatement of material fact," id. at 767, the
Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case, id. at 766, 770. In the
course of its opinion, the court, relying on Birnbaum, stated that to support a claim
under rule 10b-5, there must be "an allegation of facts amounting to deception." Id. at
768. In the court's opinion, lOb-5 was not "a mandate to inquire into every allegation of
breach of fiduciary duty respecting the issuance or sale of corporate securities." Id. at
768. See generally Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60, 64-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Robbins v.
Banner Indus., Inc. [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,861, at
95,950, 95,952 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); see also Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766, 770
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) ("the Securities Acts have [not] swallowed the whole body of state
statutory and common law covering the internal administration of the affairs of corporations and the fiduciary obligations of those who manage and control them"). For a discussion of the impact of the Birnbaum holding on cases alleging a 10b-5 violation based
upon a breach of fiduciary duty, see 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 46, § 4.7, at 530-32;
Bloomenthal, From Birnbaum to Schoenbaum: The Exchange Act and Self-Aggrandizement, 15 N.Y.L.F. 332, 337-38 (1969).
61 See, e.g., Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 379 (2d Cir. 1974)
("put[ting] to rest ... a slow-to-die contention" that 10b-5 did not reach alleged fraud
because it constituted no more than " 'corporate mismanagement' "), cert. denied, 421

19781

NOTES

haps most clearly in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook.62 Schoenbaum was a
derivative action brought by shareholders who alleged that their corporation had been defrauded by its directors when its stock was sold
to a controlling shareholder at an inordinately low price. 63 The plaintiffs contended that, as part of an alleged scheme to defraud, the directors had deliberately sold the stock at a low price while aware of undis64
closed information which greatly enhanced the value of the shares.
The court could have based its decision solely on this nondisclosure by
holding that the failure to disclose to the other shareholders constituted a deception upon them, and consequently a deception upon the
corporation. 65 The holding, however, was worded in broader terms.
U.S. 976 (1975); Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 822, 826-27 (5th Cir. 1970) (denial of
motion to dismiss affirmed where 10b-5 violation asserted by alleging "that defendants
• . . caused at least a majority of the Alabama National board to act adversely to the
interests of their corporation"); Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 882 (5th Cir. 1970)
(10b-5 violation 'asserted "when officers and directors have defrauded a corporation by
causing it to issue securities for grossly inadequate consideration"). See also Pappas v.
Moss, 393 F.2d 865, 869 (3d Cir. 1968) (even though all board members were aware of
all material facts involved in the transaction, 10b-5 violation was asserted by viewing
the independent shareholders as having been deceived).
Although the definitions of fraud in these cases were broad enough to suggest that a
misrepresentation or nondisclosure was not a requirement for a 10b-5 violation, it has
been noted that all of the cases did involve a deception as part of a broader mismanagement scheme. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. at 474-75 & n.15; 89 HARV.
L. REv. 1917, 1926-27 (1976).
62 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
63 405 F.2d at 218. The defendants in Schoenbaoum included Aquitaine Co. of
Canada, Ltd., Paribas Corp. and the directors of Banff Oil Ltd. Id. at 217. Both Banff
and Aquitaine were Canadian corporations and the transaction in question had occurred
in Canada. In the first hearing of the case, which was before a three-judge panel, a
threshold question was whether the 1934 Act had extraterritorial applicability. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206-09 (2d Cir. 1968). The three-judge panel had
held that the Act had extraterritorial application "at least when the transactions involve
stock registered and listed on a national securities exchange, and are detrimental to the
interests of American investors." Id. at 208. The Second Circuit, sitting en bane, did not
disturb this holding. 405 F.2d at 217. See generally 8 SETON HALL L. REV. 795 (1977).
64405 F.2d at 218. Aquitaine was the controlling shareholder of Banff and had
elected three of the eight directors on the Banff board. Id. at 217. In 1964, Banff and
Aquitaine had embarked on a series of "joint explorations for oil." Id. Shortly before a
test well struck oil, the Banff board had approved an offer of 500,000 shares of Banff
stock to Aquitaine with a sale price of $1.35, equal to a median between the asking and
bidding prices for that day on the Toronto Stock Exchange. Id. After the discovery of oil
was made public in 1966, the price of Banff stock rose to a high of $18 per share. Id.
65 Bloomenthal, supra note 60, at 346-47. This approach had been taken by Judge
Hays in his dissent in the previous hearing before the three-judge panel which had
dismissed the complaint. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 214-15 (2d Cir.
1968). Judge Hays reasoned that
[t]here is, of course, no justification for interposing the corporate fiction between the directors and the minority stockholders who were the victims of the
directors' fraudulent actions. In order to establish fraud it is surely not neces-
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Noting the allegation that "a controlling influence" had been exerted
by the defendant to procure the issuance of the stock at an inadequate price, the court held that "[i]f it is established that the
transaction took place as alleged it constituted a violation of Rule
10b-5, subdivision (3)."66 The use of controlling influence in such a
manner, resulting in an unfair advantage for the majority shareholder,
is a classic example of a breach of fiduciary duty traditionally governed
by state corporate law. 67 As a result of this language in Schoenbaum,
many commentators viewed that decision as establishing a new standard of "fairness" under which a breach of fiduciary duty would con68
stitute fraud actionable under rule 10b-5.
This theory seemingly gained some support from the Supreme
Court in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty
sary to show that the directors deceived themselves. It must be enough to show
that they deceived the shareholders, the real owners of the property with which
the directors were dealing. Deception of the [minority] shareholders . . . is
established by showing that the directors withheld from them information that
would have revealed the true value of the treasury stock.
Id. at 215.
The Third Circuit had earlier expressed the same theory in Pappas v, Moss, 393
F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968), when it held that the transaction in question, involving selfdealing directors, constituted a "deception of the independent stockholders [which was]
no less real because 'formalistically,' the corporate entity was the victim of the fraud."
Id. at 866, 869.
" 405 F.2d at 219. Professor Bloomenthal has stated that this was "the first time
[the court] applie[d] subparagraph 3 of Rule 10b-5 to find that there can be practices ...
that operate as a fraud even in the absence of misrepresentations or a failure to disclose." Bloomenthal, supra note 60, at 347-48. The Schoenbaum court, however, went
on to state that "[mioreover, Aquitaine and the directors of Banff were guilty of deceiving the stockholder of Banff (other than Aquitaine)." 405 F.2d at 220 (citing Pappas v.
Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968)). This mention of a deception in Schoenbaum has
been described "as an entirely independent basis for liability." Note, supra note 42, at
1032. Professor Bloomenthal evidently agreed with this description for he noted that
"the court [had taken] a giant step beyond what it had to take to reach the particular
result." Bloomenthal, supra at 348. Nevertheless, the presence of a deception in
Schoenbaum provided support for the holdings of subsequent courts which maintained
the deception requirement in lob-5 cases. See notes 78-84 & 128 infra and accompanying text.
67 89 HARV. L. REV. 1917, 1925 & n.46 (1976); see Bloomenthal, supra note 60, at
332-33; note 25 supra and accompanying text.
68
See Bloomenthal, supra note 60, at 354-55; Comment, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook:
The "New Fraud" Expands Federal Corporation Law, 55 VA. L. REv. 1103, 1113-16
(1969). In Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 379 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975), the court found that "the authority of" the O'Neill
v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964), and Birnbaum holdings, with respect to the
deception requirement, "was 'seriously undercut' by Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook" (quoting from First Am. Corp. v. Foster, 51 F.B.D. 248, 251 (N.D. Ga. 1970)). See also Note,
supra note 42, at 1032-33.
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Co. 69 in which the Court proclaimed that "{s]ection 10(b) must be
read flexibly, not technically and restrictively. "' 70 In Bankers Life, the
Court enunciated a broad approach to the " 'in connection with' "
language of the statute 71 and held that an alleged fraud need only
"touc[h] [a] sale of securities" to satisfy this requirement. 72 This approach suggested the possibility that the rule's coverage could be expanded to reach questions of corporate mismanagement previously
resolved in state courts. 73 In the course of its opinion, the Court also
discussed the type of conduct encompassed by the statute and stated
that breaches of fiduciary duty " 'are all a single seamless web' " used
in conjunction with other practices to effectuate a fraud. 74 The Court
concluded, however, "that Congress by § 10(b) did not seek to regulate transactions which constitute no more than internal corporate
mismanagement." 75 Therefore, although an allegation of a breach of
fiduciary duty did not eliminate the possibility of 10b-5 coverage, a
deception or manipulation accompanying the breach remained a re76
quirement for the application of the rule.
- 404 U.S. 6 (1971).

70 Id. at 12.
71 See id. at 10, 12-13. For the text of section 10(b), see note 14 supra.
72 404 U.S. at 12-13. Bankers Life involved a scheme in which an individual named
Begole and others arranged to purchase from Bankers Life all the stock of its whollyowned subsidiary, Manhattan Casualty Co. See id. at 7-8. The stock was paid for with
Manhattan's assets through a scheme in which Sweeny, installed as President of Manhattan by the Begole group, "allegedly deceived" some of the board members by not
informing them that the proceeds of the sale were being misappropriated. Id. at 7-9 &
n.1. Consequently, Begole held all of Manhattan's stock, "having used $5,000,000 of
Manhattan's assets to purchase it." Id. at 8. The Second Circuit had dismissed the suit
brought by the liquidators of Manhattan on the basis that the alleged deception did not
occur "'in connection with the purchase or sale of a security" as required by rule 10b-5,
but instead occurred after the sale when the proceeds were misappropriated. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 430 F.2d 355, 360-61 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'd,
404 U.S. 6 (1971). As such, in the Second Circuit's view, the scheme involved "no more
than 'fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs' " having no adverse affect on
"[tihe purity of the trading process." 430 F.2d at 360-61 (quoting from Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d at 464). In reversing the Second Circuit, the Supreme
Court answered that section 10(b) "is not 'limited to preserving the integrity of the
securities markets,' " but is broad enough to cover all securities transactions whether
entered into on a market or face-to-face. 404 U.S. at 12 (quoting from 430 F.2d at 361).
73 See Cox, Fraud Is In The Eyes Of The Beholder: Rule lOb-5's Application To
Acts Of Corporate Mismanagement, 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 674, 683 (1972); Note, supra note
42, at 1013. Professor Cox stated that "the Bankers Life opinion suggests that . . . an
allegation [of an unfair exchange], buttressed with a charge that the security transaction
was instigated in derogation of the controlling stockholder's fiduciary obligation to the
minority, may state a cause of action under the statute," Cox, supra, at 683.
74404 U.S. at 11-12.
75 Id. at 12.
7 See id. at 12-13. The Court stated that "Lt]he crux of the present case is that
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Subsequently, the traditional requirement, derived from the
common law definition of deceit, 77 that a deception in the form of a
misrepresentation or nondisclosure be present in an action under
10b-5, was explicitly articulated by the Second Circuit in Popkin v.
Bishop. 78 The same circuit which four years earlier had decided
Schoenbaum stated that "our emphasis [in Schoenbaum] on improper
self-dealing did not eliminate non-disclosure as a key issue in Rule
10b-5 cases." 79 In Popkin, the court affirmed the dismissal of a complaint, seeking injunctive relief, in which the minority alleged that
"unfair" exchange ratios had been established by controlling shareholders in a long-form merger proposal requiring prior shareholder
approval. 80 The Second Circuit held that the absence of any material
Manhattan suffered an injury as a result of deceptive practices touching its sale of securities as an investor." Id. (emphasis added); see Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 718,
719 (2d Cir. 1972); 89 HAHV. L. REV. 1917, 1928 (1976).
The Court's holding in Bankers Life had an almost immediate effect on at least one
case in the lower federal courts. See Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722, 737-38 (2d Cir.
1972) (rehearing en banc). In Drachman, the plaintiffs-shareholders alleged a fraudulent
scheme in which the defendants conspired to gain control of their corporation by calling
in convertible debentures at a time when conversion to common stock was unfavorable.
Id. at 724-25. The plaintiffs contended that their corporation was injured to the extent of
$6.6 million-the cost of redeeming the debentures, Id. at 725. At the initial hearing
before a three-judge panel, the complaint was dismissed on the basis that "§ 10(b) liability arises only when the alleged fraud between the parties and/or alleged market
manipulation or deception is intrinsic to the securities transaction itself." Id. at 732
(footnotes omitted). Subsequent to this decision, the Supreme Court decided Bankers
Life and the Second Circuit granted a rehearing en banc in the Drachman case. See id.
at 736-37. On rehearing, the Drachman court reversed its earlier holding and, citing
Bankers Life, held that the plaintiffs had stated a valid claim under section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5. Id. at 737.
77 See notes 49-55 supra and accompanying text.
78 464 F.2d 714, 719-20 (2d Cir. 1972).
9
7 Id. at 719.
80 Id. at 716-17, 720. Popkin was a shareholder of Bell Intercontinental Corp. which
proposed to merge with two of its subsidiaries into the Equity Corp. Id. Equity was the
controlling shareholder of Bell at the time of the proposed merger. Id. Popkin alleged
that the "exchange ratios" established by Equity and the board of Bell "were unfair to
the minority shareholders of Bell and its subsidiaries." Id. at 716. The jointly-issued
proxy statement fully disclosed the material facts pertaining to the merger, including the
controlling position of Equity and its ability to approve the merger regardless of the
outcome of the minority's vote. Id. at 716, 718. The merger had been mandated by a
settlement reached in a previous suit brought by Equity shareholders requesting "a
simplification of the Equity system corporate structure." Id. at 716.
Popkin brought a derivative suit seeking injunctive relief to prevent the merger in
which he alleged that the proposed exchange ratios constituted a breach of fiduciary
duty even though full disclosure had been made. Id. In reaching its conclusion, the
Second Circuit assumed that the ratios were "unfair" as alleged and that the controlling
voting position of Equity did not, by itself, foreclose relief under section 10(b) if the
requisite elements of a violation could be established. Id. at 717-18.
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misrepresentation or nondisclosure invalidated the plaintiffs' claim
under rule 10b-5. 81 Defining the purpose of the statute as "impos[ing]
a duty to disclose and inform," the Popkin court reasoned that, in
transactions which require prior shareholder approval, the federal
interest is satisfied when the shareholders are given all the information necessary to make an informed investment decision. 8 2 Schoenbaum was distinguished since the transaction in that case had not required prior shareholder approval.8 3 The Popkin court reasoned that
emphasizing disclosure in transactions such as those in Schoenbaum
would be meaningless since "full and fair disclosure . . . [would]
84
rarely occur. "
With two such seemingly contradictory decisions as Schoenbaum
and Popkin, the Second Circuit was again confronted, in Green, with
the problem of determining the type of conduct proscribed by rule
81 Id. at 720. The Second Circuit noted that the plaintiff "was willing to concede
that there was [full] disclosure." Id. at 720 n.17. The court, therefore, found it unnecessary to decide whether a 10b-5 complaint must contain an allegation of nondisclosure on
its face. See id.
82 Id. at 719-20. Popkin had contended that the requirement of nondisclosure was
"irrelevant" since the majority shareholder was capable of approving the merger without the minority's votes. Id. at 720. The court answered this argument by reasoning that
the minority, in possession of all the information required by the federal statute, would
then be in a position to challenge the merger "as unfair" in a state court. Id.; see Cox,
supra note 73, at 686. For a discussion of what information should be disclosed in a
going private transaction in order to satisfy the full disclosure requirement, see Borden,
supra note 2, at 1029.
83 464 F.2d at 719. The Popkin court tried to limit the Schoenbaum holding by emphasizing the presence of a nondisclosure in that case. See id. For example, the court
stated that while the "interested insiders" in Schoenbauni had the benefit of full disclosure, a fraud had been perpetrated upon the minority by not disclosing the information
to them. Id. The court also discussed the dissent in the original panel opinion in which
Judge Hays had reasoned that the nondisclosure to the minority shareholders constituted a deception upon the corporation which was selling its shares. Id.; see 405 F.2d at
214-15; note 65 supra. While the Popkin court recognized that the en banc Schoenbaum
opinion could be interpreted as negating the disclosure requirement in certain instances, the court in Popkin felt that the Schoenbaum language only "suggested" such
an interpretation since the opinion had concluded with the statement that a deception
had occurred. See 464 F.2d at 719; 405 F.2d at 220; note 66 supra. Professor Borden
suggested that Popkin and Lewis v. Siegel, [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 93,992 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), taken together, "appear effectively to bar federal review
of [going private] transactions in the absence of a disclosure violation." Borden, supra
note 2, at 1034. In Lewis, individual shareholders alleged that an offering of debentures
to the corporation's executives, which was not limited by subscription rights as was the
same offering made to the shareholders, violated section 10(b). [1973 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,992, at 93,984-85. The court dismissed the claim since a
nondisclosure had not been alleged even though the transaction was one not requiring
prior shareholder approval. Id. at 93,985.
84 464 F.2d at 719.
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10b-5. 8 5 Relying on the fact that only one clause of the rule explicitly refers to omissions and misrepresentations, the court of appeals
reasoned that "fraud" as used in the other two clauses must be broader in scope than the common law definition of deceit and that, as
such, the term was expansive enough to encompass a breach of
fiduciary duty by majority shareholders in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.8 6 Disregarding the fact that Delaware law
required no business purpose to effectuate a short-form merger, the
court held that the lack of corporate purpose for the Kirby-Forest
merger constituted a breach of the majority shareholder's fiduciary
duty. 8 7 Citing Schoenbaum, the Green court stated that in instances
involving such breaches it was not necessary under rule 10b-5 for
the minority shareholders to allege that a misrepresentation or nondisclosure had occurred. 8 The court distinguished Popkin by stating
that, in Popkin, "there was a corporate business purpose so strong as
to be . . . compelling" and thus no breach of fiduciary duty had been

alleged.89 Furthermore, in Popkin, prior shareholder approval was
required and, in the court's view, this factor made emphasis on disclosure sensible. 9 0 In cases such as Green, however, where a merger
without a justifiable business purpose may be accomplished without
prior shareholder approval, disclosure becomes irrelevant since "even
the most brazen disclosure of" the lack of business purpose does not
"mitigat[e] the fraudulent conduct." 9 '
85 See 533 F.2d at 1286-87.
96Id. at 1286-87.
87 Id. at 1289-90. The court of appeals first reasoned that the existence of the Delaware state appraisal remedy in no way precluded the granting of federal relief if the
plaintiffs stated a valid claim under the federal securities laws. Id. at 1286. The court
quoted Popkin for the proposition that " "[wihere Rule 10b-5 properly extends it will be
applied regardless of any cause of action that may exist under state law.' " Id. (quoting
from 464 F.2d at 718).
88 533 F.2d at 1287, 1290. The court evidently was influenced in its finding of a
10b-5 violation by the increasing growth of going private transactions and felt that this
phenomenon required a broad interpretation of the rule in order to protect minority
shareholders. See id. at 1287; Borden, supra note 2, at 987; Note, supra note 2, at 903.
89 533 F.2d at 1291. The "corporate business purpose" in Popkin referred to by the
Green court was evidently the settlement of a previous case which required the Popkin
merger. See 464 F.2d at 716; note 80 supra.
90
Id. at 1291-92. The Green court quoted dictum in Popkin which suggested that,
in a transaction not requiring prior approval by shareholders, " 'it makes sense to concentrate on the impropriety of the conduct itself rather than on the "failure to disclose"
it because full and fair disclosure in a real sense will rarely occur.' " Id. at 1292 (quoting from 464 F.2d at 719).
9'533 F.2d at 1292. In a case decided one week prior to Green, the Second Circuit
had upheld a complaint challenging a long-form merger under New York state law. Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277, 1278 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded, 429
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This broad interpretation by the Second Circuit of the fraud
proscribed by rule 10b-5 expanded the coverage of the rule and
created the possibility of an even greater amount of federal litigation
brought by minority shareholders alleging a violation of the rule
based upon a breach of fiduciary duty. 92 In contrast to this expansive
interpretation, the Supreme Court, in two cases decided prior to the
Second Circuit's decision in Green, had restrictively interpreted the
rule's provisions.
In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 93 the Court upheld
the validity of the Birnbaum "purchaser-seller" standing limitation on
implied rights of action under section 10(b). 94 During the years folU.S. 881 (1976), vacated in part and remanded, 552 F.2d 472 (2d Cir. 1977) (portion of
complaint seeking injunctive relief ordered dismissed as moot following state court enjoinment of merger). In Marshel, the plaintiffs had requested injunctive relief to prevent
a merger of their corporation, Concord Fabrics, Inc., with AFW Fabric Corp. on the
grounds that the merger lacked a justifiable business purpose. Id. at 1278, 1280. No
deception was alleged, see id. at 1279, 1282, and it would appear that Popkin should
have been controlling since prior shareholder approval was required for the merger, see
notes 82-83 supra and accompanying text. In upholding the plaintiff's complaint, however, the Second Circuit distinguished Popkin since the merger in. Popkin was challenged on the fairness of its terms and not on "[t]he propriety of the merger itself." 533
F.2d at 1282. As the merger itself was alleged to be the "fraudulent scheme" in Marshel, the court held that it was not necessary for the plaintiffs to also allege a deception.
Id.
The Green and Marshel opinions by the Second Circuit were hailed by some commentators as necessary to "correct patterns of abuse . . . because of their deleterious
effect on public investor confidence." Comment, The Second Circuit Adopts a Business
Purpose Test for Going Private: Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp. and Green v. Santa Fe
Industries, Inc., 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1184, 1196 (1976); see Note, Federal "Going Private"
Standards: A New Direction for the Second Circuit?, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 442,
452 (1976); 64 GEo. L.J. 1381, 1387, 1399 (1976). The decisions were also criticized,
however, for the vagueness inherent in a valid-business-purpose standard, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1917, 1930-32 (1976), and for their encroachment on areas of substantive corporate
law traditionally governed by the states, id. at 1928-29; 10 GA. L. REV. 1059, 1068
(1976).
92 See 10 GA. L. REV. 1059, 1067 (1976); 89 HARV. L. REV. 1917, 1924-26, 1928-30
(1976).
93 421 U.S. 723 (1975). Blue Chip involved a consent decree arising out of an antitrust suit which required that retailers, who had not previously held Blue Chip stock, be
offered an opportunity to purchase stock in a reorganized corporation. Id. at 725-26.
Accordingly, Blue Chip reorganized and made the offer to the retailers in 1968. Id. at
726. A prospectus containing details of the offer and Blue Chip's financial condition was mailed to all the offerees. Id. Based on an allegedly "overly pessimistic appraisal of Blue Chip's status and future prospects" contained in the prospectus, the plaintiffs
declined to purchase any of the offered stock. Id. at 726-27. Two years later, the plaintiffs brought suit for "damages representing the lost opportunity to purchase." Id. at 727.
9Id.
at 731, 751-52, 755; see 193 F.2d at 463. The plaintiffs in Birnbauin had alleged a scheme in which Feldmann, the controlling shareholder, president and chairman of the board of directors of Newport Steel Corp., rejected a merger offer from
another company which would have been very lucrative for all of Newport's share-
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lowing the Birnbaum decision, several cases were decided which had
tended to relax the strict "purchaser-seller" rule. 95 In reaffirming the
validity of this early limitation on implied rights of action, the Blue
Chip Court relied on "[t]he longstanding acceptance" of the
Birnbaum rule in federal courts 96 and on a perceived congressional
97
intent to protect only purchasers and sellers under section 10(b).
holders. 193 F.2d at 462. Feldmann then sold his controlling block of shares to the same
company at a price which was double the stock's market value. Id. The plaintiffs contended that this transaction violated section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 since Feldmann had
made misrepresentations in a letter sent to the minority shareholders concerning the reason for termination of merger negotiations. Id. They alleged a further violation occurred
when the new board of directors, who took office after the sale, omitted from a letter
sent to the shareholders the selling price of Feldmann's stock and the " 'captive' " status
of Newport Steel which had resulted from the sale. Id. In order to satisfy the statutory
language of section 10(b), the plaintiffs argued that the alleged fraud was perpetrated
upon Newport and its shareholders "in connection with the sale of Feldmann's stock."
Id. The court held that such a "connection" between the sale of the stock and the
alleged fraud was insufficient under section 10(b) which was intended by Congress to
protect only actual purchasers and sellers of stock. Id. at 463-64. As the plaintiffs had
neither bought nor sold stock in the transaction which was the basis of the alleged
fraud, they did not come within the protection afforded by the statute and the rule. Id.
at 464. In their complaint, the plaintiffs had contended that Feldmann and the other
defendants had breached their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its minority
shareholders by effectuating the sale of Feldmann's stock. Id. at 462. They argued that
the "fraud" proscribed by 10b-5 was intended to protect shareholders against such
breaches and that therefore the rule was not limited to purchasers and sellers of stock.
Id. at 463. The court rejected this contention as a basis for supporting a claim under rule
10b-5. Id. at 464; see note 59 supra and accompanying text.
15 For example, in Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967), the court established the "forced seller" doctrine. See 374
F.2d at 633-34; Note, supra note 42, at 1018 n.49. In Vine, a merger for inadequate
consideration was alleged. 374 F.2d at 630. Although the plaintiff had not surrendered
his stock at the time of the suit, the court held that he fell within the "purchaser-seller"
class since "in order to realize any value for his stock, [he] must exchange the shares for
money from [the defendants]." Id. at 634.
Other cases have recognized that when a corporation issues its own stock, it is a
"seller" under the rule and thus shareholders may bring derivative suits on its behalf if
the corporation is defrauded in the issuance of its stock. See, e.g., Rekant v. Desser, 425
F.2d 872, 877, 878 (5th Cir. 1970); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, 266 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967); Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24, 27, 29
(2d Cir. 1964); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 203 (5th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961). In Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490
F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974), the Seventh Circuit explicitly
rejected the "purchaser-seller" requirement. Id. at 659. This trend toward relaxation of
the "purchaser-seller" rule led several commentators to suggest that the Birnbaum limitation had lost validity. See Gallagher, 10b-5 After Blue Chip Stamps: How Stands the
Judicial Oak?, 80 DICK. L. REv. 1, 34-35 (1975); Lowenfels, Demise of the Birnbaum
Doctrine: A New Era for Rule 10b-5, 54 VA. L. REv. 268, 269, 272-77 (1968); Note,
supra note 42, at 1017 n.49.
997 421 U.S. at 733.
Id. at 726-27. In holding that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue under section
10(b), the Court cited section 17 (a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976), which
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The Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder9" provided a
further example of a tendency to limit the scope of rule 10b-5. 99 In
Ernst, the Court held that the common law requirement of scienter,
or the intent to deceive, was a requisite element of a private action
for violation of 10b-5. 100 In rejecting a negligence standard, the Court
proscribes fraudulent activities " 'in the offer or sale of any securities' " (emphasis by
the Court) as evidence that if Congress had intended to protect offerees under section
10(b) it would have done so explicitly. 421 U.S. at 733-34 & n.6. Further evidence of
congressional intent to protect only purchasers and sellers was found by the Court in
sections 11(a) and 12 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 1 (1976), and section 18 of the
1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1976). Id. at 735-36. These sections expressly create private
remedies limited to purchasers or sellers. Id. The Court felt that Congress would not
have intended an implied right of action, such as the one under section 10(b), to have a
broader "plaintiff class" than those rights of action explicitly created by Congress. Id. at
736.
The Blue Chip majority additionally found that "policy considerations," 421 U.S. at
737, including the threat of "vexatious litigation" brought by parties alleging that they
had declined to purchase stock as a result of some conduct by a corporation, id. at 740,
mandated a reaffirmance of the Birnbaum rule, id. at 749. In the Court's view, defending against such suits could impede normal corporate activity and thus lead to out-ofcourt settlements not merited by the facts of the plaintiff's case. Id. at 740-43. Since the
cost of such settlements would be borne by " 'innocent investors,' " id. at 739, limiting
the class of plaintiffs could foster greater market security, see id. The Court also noted
an evidentiary problem in granting standing to non-purchasers and non-sellers inasmuch
as proof of their claims would depend upon an "oral version of a series of occurrences"
rather than upon documentary evidence of purchase or sale. Id. at 742. Therefore, many
cases, having little or no merit, could require a trial rather than being susceptible to
out-of-court settlement. Id.
98 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
99 See Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the Federal Securities
Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 CEO. L.J. 891, 899 (1977); 89 HARV. L. REv. 1917,
1929 (1976).
100 425 U.S. at 214; see W. PROSSER, supra note 49, § 107, at 699-700. Ernst &
Ernst, an accounting firm, had prepared audits and annual reports required by § 17(a) of
the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976), for the First Securities Company of Chicago.
425 U.S. at 188. Several customers of First Securities, a brokerage firm, contended that
a fraud had been perpetrated upon them by Nay, the president of First Securities,
whereby they were induced into investing in allegedly high-yield accounts which were
nonexistent. Id. at 188-89. The fraud was eventually discovered when Nay committed
suicide, leaving a note stating that First Securities was bankrupt and that the accounts
in question were " 'spurious.' " Id. The defrauded customers thereafter initiated several
suits against various defendants, including Ernst & Ernst. Id. at 189-90 & nn.2, 4. In
their suit against Ernst & Ernst, the plaintiffs alleged that improper auditing practices
followed by the accounting firm had allowed Nay to continue his scheme. Id. at 190. As
the customers admitted that Ernst & Ernst was guilty of no "intentional misconduct,"
their cause of action depended upon the acceptance of a negligence standard for 10b-5
violations. Id. Furthermore, as Ernst & Ernst had not perpetrated the fraud itself, the
claim was also dependent upon acceptance by the court of the theory that an abettor of
a fraud was liable under 10b-5. See id. at 191-92 n. 7 . Whether a 10b-5 action required
scienter had been a controversial question in the lower courts prior to Ernst. 425 U.S.
at 197; Cox, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder: A Critique and an Evaluation of Its Impact
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relied heavily upon the statutory language of section 10(b), focusing
especially on the term " 'manipulative.' "101 In the Court's view,
"'manipulative' . . . . is and was virtually a term of art. . .
.connot[ing] intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud."' 10 2 The Court reasoned that since private remedies under rule
10b-5 were "judicially implied," it was particularly important to look
to the statutory language in determining what "standard of liability"
Congress intended to impose. 10 3 This rejection of a negligence standard in Ernst evidenced the Supreme Court's intention to interpret
restrictively the provisions of rule 10b-5 by following a policy of
strict statutory interpretation in order to effectuate congressional intent, with emphasis placed on traditional definitions of terms used in
04
the statute. 1
upon the Scheme of the Federal Securities Laws, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 569, 570 nn.5--10
(1977).
101425 U.S. at 199.
102 Id. The Court's reliance on the "operative language of the statute," id. at 199200, in finding the requirement of scienter in section 10(b) has been criticized. See Cox,
supra note 100, at 575. Professor Cox argued that the term ' 'deceptive' " as used in the
statute is broader in meaning than the "dictionary" definition of " 'manipulative' " relied upon by the Ernst Court. Id. Under Professor Cox's analysis, the deceptive conduct
proscribed by the statute need not be intentional. Id.
103 425 U.S. at 200-01. The Court considered some of the express private rights of
action created by Congress under the Acts. Several of the 1933 Act remedies provide
that negligence is a sufficient standard of liability while others, under both Acts, require
intent. Id. at 200. As Congress had established varying standards of liability in these express causes of action, the Ernst Court reasoned that "[aiscertainment of congressional
intent with respect to the standard of liability created by a particular section of the Acts
must therefore rest primarily on the language of that section." Id.
104See Cox, supra note 100, at 593-94; Lowenfels, supra note 99, at 898-900
("thrust of Hochfelder is narrow, strict constructionist, and defendant oriented"). In addition to relying upon the statutory language of section 10(b), the Ernst Court examined
the legislative history of the section and the administrative history of the rule to determine if there was any indication that negligence was the intended standard. 425 U.S.
at 201-07, 212-14 & n.32. Although the Court recognized that this history did not provide "any explicit explanation" of Congress' intent concerning the standard of liability
under section 10(b), the majority felt that portions of the House hearings and early
drafts of section 10(b) supported the conclusion that section 10(b) was intended to proscribe only intentional conduct. Id. at 201-02. Professor Cox criticized the Court's reliance on the legislative history which he considered inconclusive. Cox, supra at 573.
The Ernst Court was also concerned with what it described as the "interrelated
components of the federal regulatory scheme governing transactions in securities." 425
U.S. at 206. In the majority's view, the "interrelated" scheme would be threatened by
recognizing an implied private right of action based on negligence which was not subject to the "significant procedural restrictions" that Congress imposed on the express
private remedies under the 1933 Act which allow a recovery for negligent conduct. Id.
at 208-11. Professor Cox interprets this concern of the Court as a suggestion that implied remedies under section 10(b) "cannot intrude upon the territory covered by the
express liability provisions." Cox, supra, at 594-95.
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The decisions in Blue Chip and Ernst necessarily limit the class
of plaintiffs who can bring a private cause of action under section
10(b). 10 5 A similar approach was utilized by the Court in Cort v.
Ash' 0 6 when it fashioned four guidelines to govern the implication of
private rights of action under all federal statutes. The initial Cort
guideline focuses on the individual plaintiffs and recommends that a
right of action not be implied unless the plaintiff is a member "of the
class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted.' 1 0 7 While
decided prior to Cort, it is evident that this was a primary concern of
the Blue Chip Court when it refused to imply a cause of action for a
non-purchaser of a security, holding that Congress had intended to
protect only purchasers and sellers under section 10(b).' 0 1 Related to
the determination of the "especial" class to be benefitted, 10 9 is an
inquiry into the legislative history of the statute involved to determine if Congress intended that such a right exist. 110 While it has long
been accepted in the federal courts that a private right of action may
Since the Court concluded that Hochfelder had failed to state a valid claim under
lOb-5, it found it unnecessary to decide "whether civil liability for aiding and abetting
is appropriate under the section and the Rule." Id. at 191-92 n. 7 . The Ernst Court also
declined to decide whether recklessness would be a sufficient basis for liability under
the rule. Id. at 193-94 n.12.
105 Lowenfels, supra note 99, at 892, 896, 899.
1- 422 U.S. 66 (1975); see Comment, Implying Private Causes of Action From Federal Statutes: Amtrak And Cort Apply the Brakes, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 53,
53 (1975).
107 422 U.S. at 78 (emphasis in original). In determining that the plaintiff in Cort
was not a member of this "especial" class, the Court examined the legislative history of
the statute involved and found that "protection" of such individuals "was at best a subsidiary purpose of" the statute. Id. at 80-81.
01 See 421 U.S. at 726-27; notes 93-97 supra and accompanying text.
In Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 37-41 (1977), the Cort guidelines
were followed in refusing to imply a private cause of action under section 14 (e) of the
1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). Section 14(e) was enacted in 1968 as part of the
Williams Act amendment of the 1934 Act which was aimed at regulating cash tender
offers. 430 U.S. at 4, 22-24. Section 14(e) proscribes misrepresentations, omissions, and
"fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender
offer." 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). The antifraud provisions of section 14(e) are essentially identical to those of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 except that they apply to tender
offers. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976) with 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976) and 17 C.F.R.
§ 240. 10b-5 (1977).
Piper involved a transaction in which an unsuccessful tender offeror, alleging, inter
alia, violations of section 14(e), brought suit against the target corporation and the successful tender offeror. 430 U.S. at 4-5. In refusing to imply a private cause of action
under these facts, the Supreme Court reasoned that the plaintiff was not a member of
the class to be benefited since Congress' purpose in enacting the section was to protect
the shareholders of the target corporation and not the tender offeror. Id. at 26-28, 37.
109See Comment, supra note 106, at 62.
110 422 U.S. at 82-84.
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be implied under section 10(b), 1" this second inquiry may be of importance in determining whether Congress intended that a particular
1 12
plaintiff have a cause of action under the statute.
The third Cort principle also involves deference to congressional
intent in enacting the particular legislation and requires that a cause
of action not be implied if to do so "would not aid the primary congressional goal" underlying the legislation. 113 While this concern was
not expressly mentioned in Ernst or Blue Chip, it is probable that the
Court was of the opinion that recognition of a cause of action in those
cases would not further the congressional purpose underlying section
14
10(b). 1
The final guideline established in Cort addresses a concern not
expressly dealt with by the Court in either Blue Chip or Ernst.
Under this criterion, a private action should not be implied under
federal law when the issues involved are of a type traditionally governed by state law. 1 15 The possible applicability of this last consideration to an alleged breach of fiduciary duty is immediately apparent.
Such claims have historically been litigated in state courts and the
extension of 10b-5 to encompass them has been a relatively recent development. 1 16 As was stated in Cort, "[ciorporations are creatures of
state law" and in the absence of express federal legislation, "state law
will govern the internal affairs of the corporation.117
The restrictive approach to section 10(b) taken by the Supreme
Court in Blue Chip and Ernst and the limiting guidelines concerning
the implication of private rights of action under federal statutes in
"I See notes 43-46 supra and accompanying text.
See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 38-39 (1977). In Piper, the
Court noted that while "shareholder-offerees," who do not tender their stock, may have
an implied right of action under section 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78 n(e) (1976), such a right
could not be implied for the "entirely separate and unrelated class of" tender offerors.
430 U.S. at 38-39.
113 422 U.S. at 84.
114 See 425 U.S. at 210; 421 U.S. at 736 & n.8, 752-55. Although the Cart opinion
also stated this third criterion in terms of whether a private right of action for the plaintiff class would be "consistent with the underlying [congressional] purposes," 422 U.S.
at 78, it is probable that an affirmative furtherance of those purposes was the intended
standard. See 422 U.S. at 84. See also Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 39-40
(1977).
"1 422 U.S. at 78, 84-85.
116 See 89 HARV. L. REV. 1917, 1925-26 (1976).
117 422 U.S. at 84. The Court recognized that the mere existence of a state law
remedy did not preclude Congress from creating an express federal right. See id. at
84-85. In Cart, however, it was more "appropriate ...to regulate [the plaintiff] to whatever remedy is created by state law."Id. at 84.
112
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general, enunciated in Cort, provided a strong indication that the
Court would not favor the expansion of rule 10b-5. In Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,1 8 the Second Circuit's determination-that a
breach of fiduciary duty alone, unaccompanied by a material nondisclosure or misrepresentation, constituted a fraud actionable under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5--was rejected. 119 In Green, the Court continued to follow its policy, previously enunciated in Ernst, of strictly
interpreting the 1934 Act's principal antifraud provision. 120 The
majority first reiterated the principle that, when interpreting the
meaning of " 'fraud' " under the rule, it is necessary to look to the
language of section 10(b) since "the language of the statute must control the interpretation of the Rule. "' 21 Relying on the explicit men118430 U.S. 462 (1977).
119Id. at 472-77; see 533 F.2d at 1287, 1290-91.
120
See 430 U.S. at 471-74; notes 98-104 supra and accompanying text. The Green
Court relied upon Ernst for the proposition that, in determining the scope of section
10(b), emphasis should be placed " 'primarily on the language of that section.' " Id. at
472 (quoting from 425 U.S. at 200). The Court noted that it was even more appropriate
to emphasize the statutory language in Green since, in contrast to Ernst, the SEC had
not indicated its support for the broader Second Circuit approach. See 430 U.S. at 473
n.12. Rather, the Green Court noted proposed SEC Rules 13e-3A and 13e-3B, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5567 (Feb. 6, 1975), [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 80,104, at 85,059, as an indication that the SEC did not support Green's
position that rule 10b-5 covered "going private" transactions in which the minority is
"'eliminate[d] ... at an allegedly unfair price." 430 U.S. at 473 n.12; see note 21 supra.
Although the Green Court mentioned these proposed rules, it declined to discuss
whether they were within the SEC's authority under section 13(e) of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78 m (1976), since such a determination was not required to adjudicate the
Green case. 430 U.S. at 473 n.12. However, one commentator has reported that the
authority of the SEC to promulgate these rules is at least questionable to some analysts
of the federal securities laws who view the SEC's "sole obligation" as that of requiring
full disclosure of material facts and preventing fraudulent and manipulative transactions.
See Katz, supra note 2, at 230.
121 430 U.S. at 472. The Court criticized the Second Circuit's interpretation of rule
lob-5 as " 'add[ing] a gloss to the operative language of the statute quite different from
its commonly accepted meaning.' " id. (quoting from Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199).
In contrast to the earlier Ernst opinion, the Green Court placed much less emphasis
on the legislative history of 10(b) in interpreting the section's provisions. Compare 430
U.S. at 473 n.13 with 425 U.S. at 201-06. See generally note 104 supra. The Court was
not convinced by Green's arguments that the legislative history indicated a congressional intent to reach the conduct of which he complained. 430 U.S. at 473; see Brief for
Respondents, supra note 17, at 11. The Green Court concluded that the legislative history of section 10(b) was too limited to be of assistance in divining congressional intent.
See 430 U.S. at 473 n.13.
Professor Cox had previously argued for this rejection of legislative history as an aid
in interpreting section 10(b) after the Court had evidenced a willingness to consider it
in Ernst. See Cox, supra note 100, at 573, 579-83. However, instead of the emphasis on
statutory construction followed by the Green Court, Professor Cox would have preferred
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tion of only " 'manipulation and deception' " in section 10(b), the
Court concluded that, in order to constitute fraud within the meaning
of rule 10b-5, the alleged violation must consist of conduct within the
definition of either term.' 2 2 After making this determination, the
Court proceeded to interpret "manipulative or deceptive" conduct as
used in section 10(b) and concluded that Santa Fe's actions constituted neither. 123 In reaching this conclusion, the majority emphasized
the traditional definitions of these terms, refusing to broaden the
scope of section 10(b) to include breaches of fiduciary duty such as
24
the one alleged by Green. 1
Under the Green holding, the term "deceptive," as used in section 10(b), is limited to the traditional definition derived from the
common law of deceit, which required an allegation of a misrepresentation or nondisclosure. ' 25 The opinion does not explicitly state that a
deception requires the presence of one of these elements. 1 2 6 It is
evident, however, that the Court was applying the traditional definition since it concluded that Santa Fe's actions, while arguably a
breach of fiduciary duty, did not constitute deception under section
10(b) inasmuch as full disclosure had been made. 1 27 The majority
emphasizing "policy considerations" by focusing on "the objectives of the federal securities laws of assuring the flow of complete, accurate information to investors without
imposing an unreasonable burden upon the conduct of business." Cox, supra at 586.
122 430 U.S. at 473-74. The Green Court criticized the Second Circuit's broader
definition of fraud as being premised on earlier Supreme Court cases which did not
involve the 1934 Act. Id. at 471 & n.ll. These earlier cases involved "fraud in the
'equitable' sense of the term," id., which the Green Court considered an inappropriate
standard in an action based upon violation of a statute which did not impose fiduciary
obligations, see id.
123 Id. at 474-77. In addition to maintaining that the alleged breach of fiduciary duty
alone constituted a fraud proscribed by rule 10b-5, Green had argued that the lack of
advance notice of the merger was a "material non-disclosure." Brief for Respondents,
supra note 17, at 27. The Supreme Court rejected the argument as a basis for 10b-5
liability since the respondents' only course of action consisted of an appraisal in the
Delaware courts. 430 U.S. at 474 n.14. As advance notice would not have enabled the
shareholders to enjoin the merger or take any other pre-merger action, the Court concluded that the lack of prior notice was not material. Id. For a discussion of the exclusiveness of the Delaware appraisal statute, see note 143 infra.
124 See 430 U.S. at 474-77.
125See id. at 474; notes 48-55 supra and accompanying text.
126 See 430 U.S. at 474.

127See id. In holding that full disclosure had been made, the Court relied upon the
factual finding of the district court that the Information Statement included no omissions
or misrepresentations. Id. In the Court's view, the shareholders' "choice was fairly presented, and they were furnished with all relevant information on which to base their
decision." Id. In this context, the shareholders' only choice was either to "accept the
price offered or ...seek an appraisal in the Delaware" courts. Id.

19781

NOTES

viewed the Second Circuit's extension of rule 10b-5, to include
breaches of fiduciary duty, as unsupported since all the cases relied
upon by the lower court involved "some element of deception" in
12 8
addition to a breach of fiduciary duty.
Similarly, the Court reasoned that since Santa Fe's conduct did
not "artificially affec[t] market activity in order to mislead investors,"
it could not be considered "manipulative" within the meaning of the
statute.1 2 9 The Ernst definition of manipulation as " 'virtually a term
of art when used in connection with securities markets' "130 was relied upon by the Green Court in reasoning that Congress, by choosing such a "technical" term, had intended to proscribe only those
practices traditionally regarded as manipulative. 13 1 The Court viewed
Santa Fe's alleged action as no more than an "instanc[e] of corporate
mismanagement" which Congress had not intended to include within
section 10(b)'s proscription against "manipulative" conduct.1 3 2 Since
the Court viewed the purpose of the 1934 Act as the fostering of full
disclosure, the majority reasoned that a strict interpretation of
"manipulative"-requiring a misleading of investors-fulfilled the
purposes of the Act without overreaching the congressional objective. 133
In the final section of the opinion, to which Justices Blackmun
and Stevens did not subscribe, Justice White set forth "additional
considerations that weigh[ed] heavily against permitting a cause of
action" for a violation of rule 10b-5 under the facts of the Green
case. 134 Relying in large measure on concerns previously expressed
128

Id. at 474-75 & n.15. The cases cited by the Court as those relied upon by the

Second Circuit were Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972);
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Schlick v. PennDixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975);
Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1972) (rehearing en banc); Shell v. Hensley,
430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970); Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906
(1969); Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968). For a discussion of the deception
element in these cases, see notes 61-76 supra and accompanying text.
129 430 U.S. at 476-77.
130Id. at 476 (quoting from Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199).
131 430 U.S. at 476-77.

132Id. at 477.

See id.
Id. at 477, 480-81. Justices Blackmun and Stevens, in their concurring opinions,
declined to join in this final section of the Court's opinion. Id. at 480-81. In their view,
this section was "unnecessary" to the holding of the case. Id. They would have preferred to dismiss Green's complaint solely on the basis of the Court's strict interpretation of fraud under lOb-5 without mention of the further "considerations" expounded by
133
13 4
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in Blue Chip and Cort,135 the majority stated that a cause of action
will only be implied under section 10(b) when it is necessary to fulfill
" 'the fundamental purpose' " of the statute. 136 The Court was of the
opinion that Green's complaint was basically concerned with "the
fairness of the terms" of the merger between Forest Products and
Kirby, rather than with disclosure of those terms. 1 3 7 Since fairness
was the gravamen of the complaint, the majority reasoned that disclosure would not be advanced by imposing liability for conduct that
may or may not have constituted a breach of fiduciary duty under state
law. 138 Reiterating that "the 'fundamental purpose'" of the 1934
Act is to promote " 'full disclosure,' " Justice White concluded that
"fairness . . . is at most a tangential concern of the statute."1 39 Recognizing that a cause of action based upon an allegation of unfairness
would give section 10(b) a scope not envisaged by Congress, the majority refused to imply a cause of action in Green's favor. 140
It is likely that the fourth consideration of Cort, concerning federal encroachment on areas traditionally left to state regulation, was a
major underlying rationale for the refusal to allow a judicial broadening of the scope of section 10(b). 14 1 The majority recognized that remthe majority. Id.
Justice Brennan, the sole dissenter to the disposition of the case, simply stated that
he would affirm "for substantially the reasons stated in the majority and concurring
opinions in the Court of Appeals." Id. at 480.
135 See id. at 477-79; notes 93-97 & 106-17 supra and accompanying text. In his
concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun referred to his dissent in Blue Chip for an explanation of his reluctance to join in this portion of the majority opinion. Id. at 480. In Blue
Chip, Justice Blackmun had criticized the majority's reliance on policy considerations,
stating that "[wie should be wary about heeding the seductive call of expediency and
about substituting convenience and ease of processing for the more difficult task of
separating the genuine claim from the unfounded one." 421 U.S. at 770 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
136430
137

U.S. at 477-78.
See id. at 478.

13sSee id. at 477-78. Some commentators, however, who view the underlying purposes of the securities laws as the protection of investors, have taken the position that
requiring "fairness" in the use of the majority's controlling influence would foster these
purposes. See Cox, supra note 73, at 689-90; Rosenfeld, An Essay in Support of the
Second Circuit's Decisions in Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp. and Green v. Santa Fe
Industries, 5 HOFSTRA L. REv. 111, 126-36 (1976); Note, supra note 42, at 1033-36,
1043-46.
139430 U.S. at 477-78. Applying similar reasoning as that used in Cort, the Green
opinion viewed fairness as " 'at best a subsidiary purpose' " of section 10(b). Id. (quoting from Cort, 422 U.S. at 80). Under the Cort criteria, a private right of action should
not be implied to serve such a "subsidiary purpose." See 422 U.S. at 78-80; notes 107 &
113-14 supra and accompanying text.
140

See 430 U.S. at 477-80.

141

See id.; notes 115-17 supra and accompanying text.
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edies for corporate mismanagement are traditionally matters of state
law. 142 At the time of the Green litigation, Delaware case law had
established that the minority shareholder's right of appraisal was the
exclusive remedy for a shareholder dissatisfied with the terms of a
short-form merger.' 4 3 Although the Green opinion recognized that
the existence of this state appraisal remedy would not necessarily
foreclose the creation of an express federal remedy by Congress, the
majority felt that a number of compelling factors militated against
judicial implication of such a remedy under the securities laws as they
currently exist.' 44 The Court was apprehensive that recognition of a
cause of action in Green would result in an uncontrollable growth of
federal dominion over corporate activities.' 45 The Green Court
realized that had they recognized an implied cause of action under
these facts, it would have become increasingly difficult to limit the
expansion of implied rights of action over matters traditionally governed by state law. 1 46 The reasoning necessary to support a decision
in Green's favor could be extended to cover any securities transaction
142 Id. at 478-79; see 89 HARV. L. REV. 1917, 1925 & n.46 (1976); notes 25 & 116-17
supra and accompanying text.
143 Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 9-10, 187 A.2d 78, 80 (Sup. Ct.
1962). In a recent decision, however, the Delaware supreme court held that appraisal
was not the sole remedy when the only purpose for a long-form merger was the elimination of minority interest. Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977). It is likely
that the Delaware courts may extend the Singer holding to other "freeze-out" devices.
See E. Folk, Holdings by State Court Grounded in Prior Law, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 19, 1977,
at 1, col. 5. However, whether short-form mergers will be subjected to this standard is
unsettled. See generally 8 SETON HALL L. REV. 712 (1977).
144 430 U.S. at 478-80. The Court felt that under the facts of Green, the state remedy
was the more "'appropriate' " one. Id. at 478 (quoting from Cort, 422 U.S. at 84); see
notes 115-17 supra and accompanying text.
145 See 430 U.S. at 478-79.
146 See id. This concern was also expressed by a commentator following the Second
Circuit decision in Green. See 89 HARV. L. REV. 1917, 1928 (1976) where it was stated
that
if the definition of fraud under section 10(b) can be expanded to include federal common law concepts of breach of fiduciary duty and waste, it is difficult
to see what significant corporate ills remain for treatment by the states.
The author also pointed out that the procedural advantages for a plaintiff in the
federal courts would increase dramatically the number of suits brought in federal forums
alleging a breach of fiduciary duty in connection with a securities transaction. Id. at
1929 & n.72. These procedural advantages include adjudication of federal and state
claims in one action, "ease of venue, nationwide service of process, and," perhaps most
importantly, the "freedom from security for expenses requirements." Id. at 1929 n.72.
While a plaintiff alleging a state claim for breach of fuduciary duty would still have to
post security expenses in a diversity suit in a federal court, the security requirement is
often dispensed with if the plaintiff can assert his claim under the federal securities
laws. Bloomenthal, note 60 snpra, at 334.
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in which a minority shareholder asserted a breach of fiduciary
duty. 1 47 The majority was concerned that not only would such widespread possibilities of actions in federal court lead to " 'vexatious
litigation,' " a concern also expressed in Blue Chip, 148 but more importantly, that the resulting "overlap" with state law would create
conflicts for corporate directors attempting to determine the standard
of behavior applicable to them. 1 49 The predicament for directors
would arise since the federal courts, in order to assure uniformity in
the system, would, of necessity, be required to develop a " 'federal
fiduciary principle' " which might conflict with the varying state formulations of fiduciary duty. 150 The majority's final objection, therefore, to recognizing a cause of action under section 10(b) for breach of
fiduciary duty was that it would result in destabilization of "established state policies of corporate regulation.' 5 1 The Green Court
stated that in the absence of congressional action, corporate directors
and investors have a right to rely upon traditional state regulation of
corporate affairs without having to contend with a shifting body of
judicially-created federal corporate law. 152 Therefore, in the absence
of any explicit legislation from Congress, the Court made it clear that
it would not accept a "judicial extension of [section] 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 to 'cover the corporate universe.' -153
The Green opinion is a continuation of the trend established by
the Supreme Court in Blue Chip and Ernst.1 54 These cases clearly
evidence the Court's desire to limit implied rights of action under
section 10(b) to those situations in which they are necessary to fulfill
147 See 430 U.S. at 478. The Court stated that "[i]t is difficult to imagine how a court
could distinguish, for purposes of Rule 10b-5 fraud . . . the alleged abuses [in Green]
from other types of fiduciary self-dealing involving transactions in securities."
148 Id. at 478-79; see 421 U.S. at 739-43; note 97 supra.
149 See 430 U.S. at 479. As an example of the conflicts corporate directors would face
if a federal standard were made applicable to them, see the discussion of the varying
formulations derived in the federal courts of the valid corporate purpose standard in 89
HARV. L. REv. 1917, 1929-31 & n.92 (1976).
150 See 430 U.S. at 479 & n.16; cf. Bloomenthal, supra note 60, at 334 ("duties under
the federal law may be greater than under state law").
151 430 U.S. at 479.
152 See id. at 479-80. Quoting from Cort, the majority stated that shareholders invest
in a corporation with an " 'understanding that, except where federal law expressly [applies], state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation.' "Id. at 479 (quoting
from 422 U.S. at 84) (emphasis by the Green Court). See notes 25 & 116-17 supra and
accompanying text for a discussion of state regulation of internal corporate affairs.
153

430 U.S. at 480 (quoting from Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law, Reflections

Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 700 (1974) (footnote omitted)).
154

See notes 93-105 supra and accompanying text.
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the 1934 Act's primary purpose of full disclosure. 155 To this end, the
Court has adopted a policy of strict statutory interpretation.15 6 The
holding, in effect, is a return to the earlier and traditional approach to
section 10(b).15 7 The limited interpretation of fraud by the Green
Court will curtail the development of the fairness standard and the
corporate purpose test which, in recent years, had been read into the
statute and the rule by several of the lower courts.1 58 Under the
Green decision, a minority shareholder confronted with an unfair
transaction approved and fully disclosed by the majority will be limited to seeking a remedy in the state courts.159 In some instances the
state remedy may be adequate, providing injunctive relief and damages for a breach of fiduciary duty. 160 In other cases, however, the
shareholder may be limited to seeking an appraisal of the fair value of
his stock. 16 ' This discrepancy in available remedies and the varying
formulations of fiduciary duty in state court decisions illustrate the
need for the development of "federal standards of corporate responsibility."' 162 As the Supreme Court in Green suggested, however,
neither section 10(b) nor rule 10b-5 was the intended vehicle for the
development of such standards, and, indeed, they are ill-suited for
such a purpose. 163 Rather than attempting to expand judicially the
current securities laws to encompass breaches of fiduciary duty, the
situation requires legislative action to develop federal fiduciary standards. 1 64 Under such a federal scheme, businesses could still be incorporated under state law, but their directors and controlling
155See 430 U.S. at 472, 477-78; 425 U.S. at 199-201; 421 U.S. at 733-34 & n.5. See
also Cox, supra note 100, at 570; Lowenfels, supra note 99, at 900; 89 HARv. L. REV.
1917, 1929, 1933 (1976).
156 See 430 U.S. at 472-73; 425 U.S. at 197-99. See also Cox, supra note 100, at
574-79; Lowenfels, supra note 99, at 898-900.
157 See notes 58-60, 77-84 supra and accompanying text.
158 See notes 61-68, 85-91 supra and accompanying text.
159 See notes 141-53 supra and accompanying text.
160See, e.g., Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977) (appraisal not sole
remedy when only purpose for long-form merger was freeze-out of minority interest);
Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 135 N.J. Super. 36, 45, 49-50, 342 A.2d 556, 571, 574
(Ch. Div. 1975) (proposed long-form merger enjoined due to unfairness of the offered
price). See also Comment, supra note 91, at 1202-05.
161See notes 2, 143 supra and accompanying text.
162 Cary, supra note 153, at 696-97.
163See 430 U.S. at 473-74, 478-80. See generally Cary, so pra note 153, at 699-700.
Professor Cary has stated that "[ilt seems anomalous to jigsaw every kind of corporate
dispute into the federal courts through the securities acts as they are presently written."
Id. at 700.
16 See 430 U.S. at 479-80; Cary, supra note 153, at 700.
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shareholders would be subject to federal statutory standards in their
16 5
transactions with minority shareholders.
A federal statute incorporating standards of fiduciary duty would
eliminate the discrepancy in relief currently available to minority
shareholders in the different states. Such a scheme would, it is
hoped, provide these shareholders with an adequate means of redress
against attempts by the majority shareholders to "freeze out" their
beneficial interest in the corporation.
BarbaraAnn Harned
165

See Cary, supra note 153, at 701-03.

